



THE MANY AUTONOMIES OF PRIVATE LAW
1
(to appear in: Social and Legal Studies 2000, with comments by Ian Macneil, David
Campbell and  Oliver Gerstenberg)
I. IL BUON GOVERNO REVISITED
 Private law theory should begin with a question where other theories end with a
result.  The  question  is:  After  deconstruction?  Critical  Legal  Studies  and  Legal
Deconstructivism have relentlessly and successfully attacked la distinction directrice of
private law, the perennial debate between a formalist and substantive orientation, between
individualist  and  collectivist  concepts,  between  neo-liberal  and  state-interventionist
policies.
2 Simultaneously in the real world, the foundations of modern private law have
been shaken by the brutal shock waves of globalisation and privatisation.
3 Both the neo-
liberal and the state-interventionist project of private law have become victim  of  the
globalisation catastrophe. Regulatory regimes of the welfare state are being dismantled,
the world markets are, of course, not in a position to produce public goods, but at the same
time more and more social activities are taken over by private governance regimes. In such
a post-catastrophic situation is there a re-constructive project of private law thinkable? And
in what direction could institutional imagination develop?
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Perhaps  we  should  take  advice  from  arguably  the  greatest  expert  in  the
reconstruction  of  private  law,  Jacques  Derrida,  who  comes  up  with  the  following
epigrammatic formula:
"The obligation or the contract does not exist between the person who gives
and the person to whom something is given, rather it exists between two
texts (between two "products" or two "productions")".
4
Are these ipsissima verba a new version of relational contracting?5 Indeed, I shall argue
that  contract  law  needs  to  be  reconstructed  as  relational,  but  not  in  the  usual
communitarian sense of the word as a nice and warm co-operative relation between
human beings, rather as a cool and impersonal relation of intertextuality. I shall make a
strictly anti-individualistic, strictly anti-economic argument for the many autonomies of
private law in which contract appears no longer merely as an economic exchange relation
between persons but as a space of compatibility between different discursive projects,
different  contracting  worlds.  And  I  shall  make  a  normative  argument  that  in  these
contracting worlds, emerging "discourse rights" which are still incipient and inchoate need
to be firmly institutionalised. More generally, I want to put these arguments in the broader
context of contemporary private law which needs to transform itself into a constitutional law
for global regimes of private governance.
For such an intertextual or interdiscursive understanding of contract, many of the
predominant theories of private law are not helpful. By defining contract as the legal
formalisation of an economic transaction they exclude a priori more significant political and
social dimensions of contracting. As Hugh Collins has argued, the sanctimony of contract
in modern legal doctrine means nothing but "the reduction of agreements and exchanges
to the limited form of monetary transaction; the sanctity is attached to money, in a word:
sanctimony".
6 This is of course true for neo-liberal concepts which subsume any social
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elements of contracting under the criterion of efficiency and transaction cost reduction,
7 but
it is also true for state interventionist projects.
8 While urging an external political regulation
of contracts they accept implicitly the economic reduction of contracting itself to a sheer
market transaction. And it is true for traditional legal doctrine which for the last 200 years
has used the commercial contract as the master plan for any contractual activity and
systematically neglected alternative traditions of contractual thinking. Indeed, one needs
to go further back in the history of legal thinking if one wants to widen this somewhat
unidimensional view of contract and private law.
I suggest to go back to the year 1338 when in a time of political turmoil and confusion,
Ambrogio Lorenzetti, a famous late-mediaeval painter from Siena, Italy, composed his
masterpiece "Il Buon Governo" as part of a cycle of four paintings "Allegorie ed effetti
del buono e cattivo governo in città ed in campagna". Lorenzetti symbolised to his
contemporaries the perversions of political power but also possible paths to a good
political government of society.9 In this painting a vision of private law and contracting
emerges which is far away from today's reductionist economic concept, that instead
sees contracting as a rich and multidimensional activity as an integral part of "Il Buon
Governo" (Lorenzetti, Frescoes of the Good and Bad Government 
http://gallery.euroweb.hu/html/l/lorenzet/ambrogio/governme/index
.html).
At first sight one sees only the usual natural law hierarchy of the People under the
King's Power and the Law which in turn are subsumed under God's Wisdom (Sapientia).
But let me draw your attention to two small however revealing details. If you look closely
to the people at the bottom of the picture you realise that they all are holding something
in their hands. At closer inspection (see left view, detail) it turns out to be a rope that is
running through their hands which binds all the different persons together. The origin of this
binding rope becomes visible when you look to the left side of the picture. A motherly
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person called Concordia assembles the rope out of the components of justitia distributiva
and justitia commutativa which are symbolised by two angels handing out justice to the
people and balanced by the majestic Justitia. The rope is in fact the vinculum juris, the
bond of the law. Coming from above, from Sapientia, it is given shape by Justitia, bound
together by Concordia, it runs then through the people’s hands. Finally - it should be
noticed - the bond of the law makes a sudden upward turn on the middle part of the
picture, symbolising the move from the horizontal jus privatum to the vertical jus publicum,
and finally ends in the sceptre of the King, the symbol of effective power, which gives
binding effects to the bond of law.
Here we have a highly suggestive vision of contract, embedded in wisdom, justice,
consensus and power which is much more than an early version of the social contract
where the state’s power is constituted by a binding agreement of the citizens. Rather than
celebrating  the  wise  exercise  of  power  in  a  public  law  regime,  it  stresses  the
comprehensive role of jus privatum in which ius symbolises a rich, multifaceted, internally
balanced relation.
10 Jus privatum not only facilitates private transactions as we would
understand it today, but it binds people together in mutuality and reciprocity, connects them
in their diversity of professions into the community, defines their position, their place, their
status in society. Moreover, the bond of private law connects people to the political regime
of the King which supports private law relations by its power and lends itself to their
enforcement  which  in  turn  is  legitimated  by  the  contracting  relation.  Concordia  is
simultaneously producing and product of private law, a relation between private law and
the community of the hearts which is almost unthinkable to the modern mind. And finally,
private law is nurtured by philosophical and religious sources, by its origins in Justitia who
in her turn is not an end in herself but derived from Divine Sapientia, thus protecting the
buon Governo and its society from all the perplexities of self-foundation and grounding
them firmly in philosophical and moral reason.
There is a second revealing detail. How many justices do exist in the buon governo?
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The painting reveals that Il buon Governo has not only One Justitia; surprisingly, in the
perfect society Justitia has two bodies. Her one body is detached from power, independent
and sovereign. Note the subtleties of the hierarchical positions: Justitia is positioned a bit
lower than the King while her celestial source, the angelic Sapientia is a bit higher than the
King. Autonomous against the realm of power and insulated from political influences, she
resolves conflicts and hands out justice to the citizens and creates consensus (Concordia)
among the citizens. But there is a second Justitia, this time residing within the realm of
power, involved now in a political role as one of the virtues (councillors to the king) who
constrain the crude power of the King (pax, fortitudo, prudentia, magnanimità, temperantia,
justitia). In this double representation of justice - in modern terminology: in its autonomy
from politics and its re-entry into politics -, we have an early symbolisation of the idea of
the Rechtsstaat, on the one side the independence of the judicial process, on the other
side the rule of law and constitutional rights, as inherent and effective self-limitations of
political  power  which  protects  the  sphere  of  actions  of  the  citizens  against  the
encroachments of politics.
Altogether Lorenzetti constructs the image of a closely integrated society. The
interesting nuance, however, is that it is no longer simply the socio-religious hierarchy
which integrates society. Rather society is composed of different bodies (the king, the
nobility,  the  people,  justitia,  sapientia,  fedes).  And  it  is  the  law,  justice  in  its  two
embodiments, that holds this society together: the binding force of an independent private
law and the re-entry of law into the realm of politics binding the exercise of power to the
rule of law.6
II. PRIVATE LAW IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY
In the buon Governo private law was an integral part of the unity of political,
economic, moral and religious aspects of society and at the same time it was contributing
to this unity by the binding force of contracts. Contract had a multi-faceted role to play. This
is strikingly different from the modern unidimensionality which instrumentalises contract as
an economic transaction for the efficient allocation of resources. Can we render this unitas
multiplex  of private law relations again relevant for our post-catastrophic reality  - without
at the same time indulging into a romanticising nostalgia for the mediaeval unity of law and
society?
The greatest challenge for private law today which excludes this romantic unity from
the outset is that in the global arena there exists a bewildering multiplicity of different
private law regimes. Lex mercatoria and other types of rules are basically law without the
state. They are the product of a number of highly specialised governance regimes that
develop autonomous political and legal orders independently from the law of the nation
state and public international law.
11 At the same time we face on the global as well as on
the national level a massive retreat of government and public law regimes. This is not only
the result of privatisation strategies of neo-liberal political parties and governments which
may be easily redressed by social democratic governments but a secular realignment of
the balance between the political and the economic system. Both these tendencies, legal
globalisation and privatisation, make it inevitable to rethink the rules of private governments
and private regulation. They are - we should admit against our sympathies for a law-making
monopoly of political democracy and popular sovereignty - genuine law. They fulfil the
legislative, administrative, regulatory and conflict-resolving role of classical public law in
different forms and contexts. At the same time one should realise how much private
governance regimes are being intertwined in the dialectics of their apolitical character and
their re-politicisation. When private governance regimes organise a take-over of public
tasks on a massive scale they will have to swallow a "poisoned pill": Massive political
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conflicts that once had been absorbed by a public law regime will not vanish by a gracious
gesture of the invisible hand. After the take-over by the market they will have to be
resolved within the framework of the new private governments. They cannot be resolved
by the market mechanisms alone. When the successful private raiders are swallowing the
poisoned pills they are being driven into a new politicisation. And this re-politicisation is not
necessarily limited to the establishment of public law structures on an international scale
à la United Nations or European Union but it entails at the same time the politicisation of
private governance itself.
12 The pressing question after the successful take-over will be:
What are the conditions of the possibility for private law regimes producing public goods?
What are the crucial historical circumstances that render plausible a reconstruction of
private  law?  Private  law  needs  to  be  reconstructed  in  the  face  of  a  thoroughgoing
fragmentation of world society. This has found its most extreme formulation in François
Lyotard's différend: the world society is fragmented into different discourses, into mutually
incompatible systems, into diverse language games which are hostile to each other,
inflicting violence upon each other.
13 The challenge is that private law needs to reconstruct
itself according to this conflictual polycontexturality14. This is the decisive difference to the
social unity of the buon governo. Contracting worlds! Global society consists of a plurality
of contracting worlds which display the double meaning of this expression. Various social
systems are contracting, shrinking, specialising toward only one orientation, one function,
one  code  externalising  everything  else  and  simultaneously  the  regulation  of  their
interrelations is not governed by hierarchical co-ordination but by heterarchical contracting.
Contracting that is supposed to play its multifaceted role today must do so under the new
condition of fragmentation of global society into a plurality of specialised discourses. Here
we see the historical background of Derrida’s somewhat enigmatic formulation on private
law:  Contract  today  can  only  be  an  interrelation  between  discourses.  Contract  is
intertextuality. It is no longer possible to maintain the unity of contract in today’s babylonic
language confusion. The price of such a unity would be a reductionism, an economic or
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a legal unidimensionality. In a time where the Old European unity of society which is so
beautifully symbolised in the buon Governo is lost and dissolved into a multiplicity of
diverse discourses on the global level, the unity of contract, too, is lost for ever and
dissolved into a multiplicity of projects within different worlds of meaning.
This leads us directly to our central thesis. The unity of contract today is fractured
in the endless play of discourses. It sounds paradoxical, but one contract is in reality
broken up into a multiplicity of contracts. The fragmentation of the social world in different
dynamics of rationality means that one and the same contract is reappearing as at least
three projects in different social worlds: (1) a productive agreement, (2) an economic
transaction and (3) a legal promise. Firstly, the contract is reconstructed as a "productive"
project  in  one  of  the  many  social  worlds,  either  in  distribution,  production,  services,
engineering, science, medicine, journalism, sports, tourism, education, or in art. Secondly,
in the economic world, the same contract is reconstructed as an entrepreneurial project,
as a profit-seeking monetary transaction under more or less competitive market conditions.
And thirdly, in the world of law, the contract is reconstructed as a legal project as a time-
binding promise and a rule producing obligation. It should be noted that this splitting of the
one contract into three diverse projects is not just the result of applying simultaneously
competing contract theories from different academic disciplines. Nor are these projects just
three different aspects of one and the same contractual relation viewed from a different
analytical perspectives. Rather these are empirical observations about three existing
independent projects each participating in a different social dynamic that is operatively
closed to others.
15 Each project is part of an autonomous path-dependent evolutionary
trajectory which propels them into quite different directions. And the unity of contract today
is no longer Concordia of People, King and Law in the buon governo but the precarious
and provisional relation of compatibility between those fragmented discursive projects.
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III. RECONSTRUCTING "RELATIONAL CONTRACT"
In this way, interdiscursivity re-introduces the social dimension into a rigid economic
view of contract which has dominated modern contract doctrine, but it does so in a different
way from current ideas about social embeddedness. Interdiscursivity has something in
common with the famous relational contract that Ian McNeil has developed in opposition
to  what  he  called  classical  contracting.  Against  the  image  of  a  discrete  exchange
transaction where self-interested rational actors formulates at the moment of conclusion
precisely defined rights and duties, he stresses the social embeddedness of contracting,
the rule producing role of long-term interaction and co-operation, the value orientation of
the actors, the processual character of contracting as a full-fledged social relation.
16
Indeed, these relational aspects overcome successfully a unidimensional economic view
of contracting. Not only do they re-introduce the dimension of time in which expectations
grow and change, but also the institutionalisation in Philip Selznick’s sense which thickens
exchange obligations into institutional commitments, the production of rules beyond the
conclusion of contract out of ongoing interaction, and above all the co-operation of the
parties as opposed to mere exchange.17 Thus, relational contracting takes account of
mutual informal adaptation, of new common interpretations in the light of new events, and
of an interactive morality.
But relational contract creates a wrong juxtaposition between an economic and a
sociological interpretation of contract where economics stands for self-interest, rational
choice, market exchange and sociology for solidarity, co-operation, community. Like hard
cases that make bad law, communitarian engagements make bad sociology. Relational
contracting expresses indeed the romantic yearning for a mediaeval unity of the buon
governo. Ian McNeil may not be aware of it, but his never-mentioned spiritual mentor, Otto
von Gierke, who actually invented relational contracting in his recourse to mediaeval
Germanic social institutions surely  was.
18  It  is  a  fatal  error  to  understand  the  social
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embeddedness of modern contract simply as communal co-operation and solidarity. Social
embeddedness today is not protection by a coherent community but the exposure of
contract to a fractured and contradictory multiplicity of highly developed social rationalities.
Sociology’s legitimate role today is not the academic pursuit of the noble ideal of solidarity,
rather the epistemology of many different social practices, the systematic reconstruction
of different and contradictory epistemes which co-exist within one society, where the
economic episteme is only one among conflicting social epistemes, among them the
science, technology, politics, health, law and art.
19 An adequate concept of relational
contracting can no longer take recourse to communal norms which unites Concordia with
Justitia, rather needs to take into account the different colliding epistemes that exist in one
society.
20 Therefore, relational does not mean only to relate contract to the requirements
of co-operation, adaptation and good faith, but to the often conflictual requirements of
different fields of action that are bound together by the institution of contract.
Relational contracting is out of step with today’s realities if it is understood as the
warm, human, co-operative interpersonal relation which overcomes the cold economic
instrumentalism with a communitarian orientation, as market transactionalism with a human
face. Instead of dreaming of contract as a co-operative exchange relation between human
actors, we should face its reality as a conflictual relation between colliding discourses,
language games, systems, textualities, projects, trajectories.
What are the consequences of such a situation in which contract is torn apart into
three diverse and partially contradictory projects each of them participating in a different
logic of action. Such a fragmentation of contract changes profoundly our understanding of
contract as a relation between two human actors who exchange their valuable resources
for the mutual satisfaction of their subjective needs. Of course, contract always needs at
least two actors - whether real people or fictitious legal persons - and an agreement, but
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the unmediated relation of such a contractual intersubjectivity is today supervened and
dominated by the more complex relation of several intertextualities. To be more precise,
intertextualities unfold in three different dimensions: first, in a relation between linguistic
artefacts, second, in a relation between two temporal stages of a specific discourse, and
third, in a relation between diverse specialised discourses.
(1) Contract as non-individual obligation
To cite Jacques Derrida again:
"The obligation does not oblige or bind living subjects, but names at the
margin of the language; strictly speaking the obligation is a move which
founds a binding and contractually obligatory relation, between the subject
and his name which is located at the margin of language."
21
                    
     
21 Derrida 1987, (dt. 141) (my translation)
Derrida alludes here to modernity’s split between "name" and "subject", between the
personae (social masks) as a multitude of linguistic constructs and the inner subjective life
of thoughts and feelings to which the persona refers to but which she never can be part of.
An uncomfortable but necessary consequence of this split is a strictly anti-individualistic
view of contracting which denies contract the role of mutually fulfilling subjective needs.
Against all the rhetoric of a revival of the individual’s autonomy in modern private law, the
will of the individual subject is not the master of the contractual relation. Rather, the
individual of contract suffers the consequences of the subject being de-centred. On the one
side  the  comprehensive  persona  in  the  rich  fullness  of  its  social  status  as  we  still
experience it in the buon governo has been split into diverse semantic artefacts at the
margin of different language games - the rational economic actor maximizing his utilities,12
the rule-bound legal subject fulfilling his contractual obligations and the producer/user of
valuable objects. None of these fractured contractual personae expresses the desires of
the full human subject. This is the first dimension of contract as intertextuality: contract
does not bind the authentic wills of human beings but the socially constructed interests of
contractual partners that exist only as semantic artefacts, as texts, as products of a
discourse. The discourses read subjective desires into the texts of their highly artificial
language games. Not intersubjectivity but intertextuality is the meaning of the contractual
relation insofar as it connects not subjective desires but socially constructed interests.
On  the  other  side  the  living  subjects  themselves  have  become  objects  of
exploitation by the many contractual relations within one contract. Via the construction of
personae, of semantic artefacts, of names at the margin of the discourses, the contractual
relation  exploits  the  psychic  energies  of  the  contractual  partners,  their  individual
knowledge, their desires and motives, for the purpose of achieving the contractual ends.
22
This is a dramatic reversal of the relation individual-contract which finds no expression at
all in the pretty hollow formulae about the revival of individual autonomy in contract law
doctrine and which at the same time is not fully reflected in consumer oriented state-
interventionist concepts
(2) Contract as discursive project
The second dimension of intertextuality rejects as too narrow the economic view of
contract as exchange. As opposed to a transaction for the mutual benefit of two economic
actors on the market, it reconstructs contract as "discursive project". The primary focus
shifts from the social to the temporal dimension. Exchange is replaced by project.
23 The
duality of the contractual partners is substituted by the duality of two texts: the original text
and its transformation by contractual promise and contractual performance. Contract binds
not just the will of the two partners; contract binds their conversation, creates an obligation
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for the social system that emerges between them. The indebtedness of contract is an
indebtedness  of  a  text  for  its  recursive  transformation  into  a  different  text,  with  a
directionality that is defined by the contract. In short, contract appears as the obligation of
a discourse for its self-transformation.
Such a view of contract directs the attention away from the obligation of the parties
to its constitutive role for a social system. Contract is constitutive for a discourse insofar
as it transforms latent expectations into actual obligations, changes mere projections into
binding promises. Here we realise the source of the social dynamics of contract; it binds
the actions of a social system in the direction of achieving the contractual purpose. This
refers primarily to the project of the special productive discourse involved to which the
contract refers. If a medical operation needs to be carried out, an engineering project to
be executed, a complex service to be performed, the contractual relation actualises this
potential and transforms it into a firm promise, an obligation and an actual performance.
In this respect contract is an obligation of the productive system involved to produce a
technological product or service, medical treatment, research result, or piece of art. A
contract obliges the focal productive social system to perform a specific operation in the
course of its self-continuation. Secondly in the economic discourse, a contract transforms
the general expectation of market prices into the concrete payment obligation and its
performance, the obligation for the syphoning off of profit for the satisfaction of future
needs. Third, in the legal system contract creates a performance obligation of the legal
discourse, it obliges the legal process to the produce new rules for future regulations and
conflict resolution. Thus, one contract puts at least three discourses under the obligation
of their simultaneous self-transformation, toward achieving their respective projects.
24
(3) Contract as interdiscursive translation
This raises the question of how these contractual projects of different discourses
are related to each other. The answer lies in the third dimension of reconstructing contract
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as interdiscursivity. Contract works as a mutual "translation" of discursive projects. If
contract  is  the  simultaneous  realisation  of  several  discursive  projects  then  the
synchronisation between them is crucial. The bond of contract of the buon governo which
had once upon a time bound diverse subjects in their reciprocal satisfaction of needs binds
today  diverse  discourses  in  the  direction  of  their  trajectories,  in  their  paths  of
self-transformation. Contract is a text written in three different languages (legal rights and
duties, economic costs and benefits, the project of the work involved, goods and services).
Then contracting means essentially "translating" discursive projects.
25 It is permanently
translating messages from the productive project into the economic and the legal project
and vice versa.
The hidden agenda is this. Via contractual translation each of these language
games is potentially in a position to extract a "surplus value" from the other language
game. This is to reformulate under new conditions the old idea that the contract gives one
individual the power over the will of another individual and vice versa, as an exploitative
relation between language games. Surplus value in the strict sense is an additionally
created value. The addition stems from the very dynamics of translation. Contractual
translation does not just represent the original meaning in a new disguise, this would not
be surplus value but recycled value. Moreover, it would ignore the incommensurability of
discourses, their closure and mutual inaccessibility  which - Lyotard stresses this over and
over  again  -  from  the  outset  do  not  allow  for  the  simple  continuation  of  discursive
operations  in  the  other  discourse.  In  a  precise  sense,  interdiscursive  translation  is
impossible.26 Here lies the paradox of toady’s babylonic language confusion. Between the
discourses, the continuation of meaning is impossible and at the same time necessary.
The way out of this paradox is - misunderstanding. One discourse cannot but reconstruct
the meaning of the other in its own terms and context and at the same time can make use
of the meaning material of the other discourse as a external provocation to create internally
something  new.  In  this  sense,  contractual  translation  basically  misunderstands  the
meaning of the agreement in the other discourse and thus creates something new. Via the
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contractual translation each of these languages is able to distort and misunderstand the
other language and from time to time make productive use of the distortion and the
misunderstanding.
How does this productive misunderstanding work? Let’s take the example of a
sponsoring contract. A multinational car producer from the Far East asks an eminent
European composer to produce an opera, a Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk for East Asian
business values, an artistic symbolisation of the corporation’s infinite spiritual creativity
which should boost its corporate image. If the French philosopher and psychoanalyst
Lacan is right then the composer and the corporation organise their econo-aesthetic
intercourse as a love-relation: "For love means to give what one does not possess". The
secret of love is that the beloved one has no property, but the lover creates the gift of love
out of the things he fantasises that the beloved one possesses. The eminent artist has in
reality nothing to offer to the Japanese corporation. He composes his symphony according
to the inner dynamics of the artistic discourse which alone decide about the artistic value
and not the market price or the popularity of the public. He possesses nothing which would
guarantee the economic success. But the contractual misunderstanding makes it possible
that in the world of economic transactions the symphony is interpreted as contributing to
the reputation of the corporation enhancing in the long term their profitability. And vice
versa, the artistic discourse is productively misunderstanding the mundane profit seeking
intentions of the corporation, translating the profit seeking capital which the corporation
invested in its economic project into material, temporal and personal energies necessary
for the achievement of the great artistic project. There is of course, no built-in guarantee
that such a misunderstanding will be productive. You cannot say in advance whether in the
famous shell, the irritation of the sand-corn will at the end create the pearl. More probable
and more frequent is the case that the symphony becomes a vulgar piece of corporate PR
which is aesthetically irrelevant. Or the other way around, if it has artistic values it will be
an blatant economic failure. But the trajectory of co-evolution will grow out of the rare and
highly improbable cases where the myriads of contracting experiments actually found by
chance the hidden space of compatibility between potential economic and artistic projects.16
Seen in this way, contract is creating a bundle of different social rationalities, is the
interrelation between social languages which binds together (potentially) productively, but
only ad hoc and momentaneously the centrifugal tendencies of their dynamics. For a short
period it binds different logics of action to each other: the productive logic of technologies,
sciences and arts with the profit-seeking logic of economic action and with the norm-
producing logic of the law. This is a rather improbable event and depends on real people
who are inventive and creative enough to spot the rare opportunities of combination that
emerge by chance. For a flash-like moment it renders compatible the incompatibilities of
diverse language games, not integrating them into a discursive whole, rather creating for
a second a black hole of compatibility which by its very empty blackness reinforces at the
same time their mutual incompatibility.
Thus contract sets into motion what one could call an ultracyclical movement
between different social systems. It makes it possible that in their autopoiesis they can
make use of each other’s cycles of self-reproduction. Through the contract, they translate
their languages into each other in such a way that they can make exploitative use of each
other’s  dynamics.  This  seems  quite  plausible  for  the  profit  chances  that  a  technical
innovation or a research result offers but only under the condition that the productive
discourse is allowed to follow its own course. And vice versa, this is plausible for the
productive chances which financial capital offers to the productive discourses but only
under the condition that it is allowed to follow the logic of profit making.
In what respect is contract law an exploitable dynamics for technology and economy
and  uses  them  in  turn  as  exploitable  dynamics?  The  answer  is  time-binding  and
indifference. Contract law consists of procedures for the resolution of conflicts and for the
termination of the contract under fair conditions. It exploits the conflictual dynamics in the
productive and in the economic sphere in order to continue its own self-production, that is
to produce legal rules out of social conflicts. On the other side, when the normative rules
that the law produces are productively misunderstood as cost factors in the economy they
bind investments and allow for longer horizons in economic planning and open new
opportunities for risky transactions. And in the productive sphere, the legal rules that are17
developed to resolve past conflicts are productively misunderstood as a strengthening of
future professional obligations. Thus, the surplus value of legal dynamics for the productive
and the economic sphere is time-binding which creates wider time-horizons for productive
and economic action.
27
But there is more to contract law than time-binding. It is the stabilisation of an
idiosyncratic discourse: a contracting world. "Contracts stabilise for a certain amount of
time a specific difference combined with indifference against everything else, included the
effects on non-participating persons and enterprises"
28. Contract law creates a specific
difference in the contractual obligation and a specific indifference by drawing a sharp line
between  participants  and  non-participants.  The  production  of  indifference  allows  for
contract’s interdiscursive role. It makes it possible to combine elements from different
discourses by excluding the rest of them.
IV. NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES: FREEDOM OF TRANSLATION
 This subtle interplay of different worlds of meaning, the fractured dissemination and
distortion of meaning in the contractual ultracycle, however, depends basically on a fragile
symmetry of chances of translation. It is constructed upon the non-translatable multiplicity
of the language games, on their separation, their autonomy, their actual freedom and on
their ability to overcome the translation paradox by their own and specific way of productive
misunderstanding.  This  opens  new  normative  perspectives.  Freedom  of  contracting
individuals now means freedom of translating discourses. It is no longer just the freedom
of economic actors to choose their partners on the market and to strike a voluntary
agreement of their choosing under market conditions. This would be only a partial aspect,
which reduces freedom of contract to the freedom of the economic discourse to translate
other discursive projects into the economic language but not vice versa. Freedom of
contract today means the freedom of all three discourses involved to translate, to transfer,
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to reconstruct operations of other discourses into their context, freedom of their productive
misunderstanding according to their internal logic. To cite Derrida again who developed his
ideas on interdiscursivity and translation in a discussion of Kant and Schelling on academic
freedom in relation to the state this freedom
"presupposes separation, heterogeneity of codes and the  multiplicity  of
languages, the non-trespassing of boundaries, the non-transparence."
29
                    
     
29 Derrida 1990b, (Dt.29)
This freedom is threatened whenever totalising if not totalitarian tendencies of one
social system attempt to superimpose its version of translation on the other worlds of
meaning. While modern freedom of contract was limited to the protection of free choice in
the market against fraud, deception, and particularly against political interference, the new
freedom of contract would need to extend to a protection of contract against the free
market itself whenever this language game begins to monopolise the right to interdiscursive
translation and superimposes the economic translation on the other discourses. Freedom
of contractual translation is directed against an economic imperialism, against tendencies
of the economic discourse  to  erect  the  new  tower  of  rationality.  The  new  babylonic
confusion of languages, however, would destroy the project of an economic rationalisation
of the world and introduce the obligation of a necessary and simultaneously impossible
translation between the different languages of the social world.
An  example  should  make  clear  that  we  are  not  dealing  here  with  academic
exercises of translation between esoteric language games but with hard core  social
problems.  A  huge  infra-structural  project  which  requires  the  co-operation  of  diverse
engineering,  scientific,  financial  and  political  skills  is  organised  by  a  combination  of
contracting and subcontracting of diverse public and private organisations. If something19
goes wrong within this huge network of individual contract and the case goes to the court,
the contract law the courts apply will follow the logic of market contracts and will tend to
resolve this conflict by isolating in legal terms each of those individual contracts. Thus, it
follows the economic perception which translates the complex unity of a productive project
into a multiplicity of economic transactions, the allocation of this project to diverse markets.
It resolves them without taking into account that the productive project in its turn translates
the isolated bilateral transactions into a large network of interdependent social, technical
and political relations. The new economic analysis of law which formulates normative
criteria for the resolution of legal conflicts would drive this dependency of the law upon
economic translation even further. The criteria - allocative efficiency and transaction cost
reduction - translate the whole productive world of technical, political, social or artistic
projects into the language of economic costs and benefits and makes this translation
binding for the law. As against this, symmetry of translation would require the law to take
their interdependency from the standpoint of technology and politics into account, even at
the expense of allocative inefficiency and increases in transaction costs.
A fundamental change in private law would amount to the following. Of course,
private law today is not living in splendid isolation from its environing society, rather it lives
in close structural coupling, via the mechanisms of contract, with the economic subsystem
of society.
30 But here is where the problem lies. Private law receives thus information about
the rest of society quasi automatically and almost exclusively through the cost-benefit
calculations of the economic discourse. Any other discourses in society, whether research,
education, technology, art, or medicine are first translated into the world of economic
calculation, allocative efficiency, transaction costs and then in this translation presented
to the law for conflict resolution. This means a serious distortion of social relations.
Recently, Hugh Collins has systematically exposed this distortion of social relation by their
economic contractualisation within four categories: 1. Bilateralisation: complex  social
relations  are  translated  into  a  multitude  of  closed  bilateral  relations;  2.  Selective
performance criteria; 3. externalisation of negative effects; 3. Power relations.
31  This
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analysis shows how urgently private law is in need of getting rid of this monopoly of
economic calculation and get in direct contact with the many other social subsystems in
society that have different criteria of rationality than the economic discourse. To be sure
this happens today - to a limited degree, to be sure - whenever contract law uses the
famous general clauses of "public policy" to invalidate an economically viable contract due
to non-economic criteria, or of "good faith" to balance economic criteria against other social
criteria  of  performance.  But  these  are  merely  marginal  corrections  of  the  dominant
economic worldview which is imported to the law by myriads of economic transactions.
They need to be replaced by the condition of symmetry within the triangle of discourses in
contract.
V. DISCOURSE RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE
Contract as translation raises the issue of authenticity, of integrity of the text, of its
survival in the free play of translation (Walter Benjamin). Freedom of translation within the
triangle  of  contractual  projects  requires  that  each  text  has  a  right  to  its  autonomy.
Violations of this right have occurred by the diverse totalitarianisms of the 20th century,
Lyssenkow's political biology as well as Silicon valley’s instrumentalisation of science, not
to speak of the worst. Totalizing regimes control the meta-rules of translation between
discourses. They monopolise the right of the ultimate translation which they then impose
upon other discourses as binding.
These "rights" are social phenomena, incipient and inchoate normative constructs
that  emerge  from  social  practices  as  compelling  claims  of  right  so  important  to  an
institutionalised practice as to make legal recognition plausible.
32 But this presupposes a
conceptual readiness of the law to respond to the pressures of social development. The
conceptualisation  of  contract  as  interdiscursivity  raises  for  the  law  the  issue  of
constitutional rights, fundamental rights for discourses. But these rights can no longer be
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seen as protecting only the individual actor against the repressive power of the state, but
would  need  to  be  reconstructed  as  "discourse  rights"  in  the  situation  of  today’s
polycontexturality. The normative correlate of contract as translation would be an extension
of constitutional rights into the context of private governance regimes. This, however,
requires a fundamental transformation of the classical model of constitutional rights in all
its four elements: individual - state - power - right.
33
(1) Constitutional rights can no longer be limited to the protection of an individual sphere
of action. They need to be extended to guarantees of freedom of discourses. Under threat
is not only the individual sphere of freedom of the artist, the researcher and the journalist,
but also the integrity of the discourses themselves, the freedom of art, education, research,
media  communication.  This  extension  from  individual  to  discourse  which  was  the
revolutionary message of systems theory to public law has fundamentally altered public law
in its understanding of constitutional rights.
34 The individualistic rhetoric is covering the
actual role of constitutional rights to protect the fragile multiplicity of discourses against the
monopolising tendencies of the political discourse. And it should be realised that the
sphere of the self-realising individual is but only one among many spheres of action that
are guaranteed by constitutional rights. Constitutional rights need to be understood as a
historical  complement  to  social  differentiation.  To  the  degree  that  the  expansionist
tendencies of the modern state threatens the fragile multiplicity of social discourses, the
emergence of constitutional rights as social institutions prevents a totalising politicisation
of them, not always successfully as we know now. 
(2) However, this protection of the fragile conditions for a multiplicity of discourses is in
need of another extension today. It can no longer be seen as only directed against the
expansionist tendencies of the repressive state. The new experience of the 19th and 20th
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century is that totalising tendencies have their origin not only in politics, but as well in other
fields  of  action,  today  especially  in  technology,  science  and  the  economy.  Thus,  a
discursive concept of constitutional rights should be expanded and directed against any
social system with totalising tendencies. In this sense, constitutional rights understood as
discourse  rights  can  be  seen  as  corner  stones  for  a  reconstruction  of  private  law.
Contemporary private law must see one of its main tasks in the protection of the many
private autonomies, not only against the repressive state but also against the expansionist
tendencies of technology, science and the market. Spheres of individual freedom and
dignity, the realm of self-realisation of the individual, the discourses of research, art,
education, media communication, even the sphere of politics itself need to protected
against the monopolisation of translation by the expansionist economic and technological
discourses.
(3)  For  this  purpose  it  is  not  enough  to  focus  on  centres  of  economic  power.  The
contemporary discussion of human rights in the private sphere is still too narrow if it
chooses the criterion of private power in order to delineate a space within the private sector
where constitutional rights should applicable as opposed to a space of genuine private
autonomy where they are not. The analogy from political power to economic power may
be fruitful for a transitory period. But it overlooks the specific dangers for a free discourse
translation that come from the economic system whose medium of action and motivation
is not power but money. The criterion for applying constitutional rights in the private sphere
should not be just power, but the specific communicative medium of the expansionist social
system involved. Freedom of research, education and art are not only endangered by the
overwhelming  power-structure  of  mega-corporations  against  which  disempowered
individuals protest in vain. Rather it is the more subtle seduction, corruption by the profit
motive, monetary incentives that  represent  the  new  dangers  for  discursive  freedom.
Business art sponsoring, private financing of education, the exposure of research to market
incentives, these are the new seductive situations which need not to be demonised as
such, but need a firm institutionalisation of constitutional rights that play a similar role as
their historically immensely successful predecessors in the political sphere.23
(4) But this new focus on medium excludes the direct analogy of a "right" as a quasi-spatial
exclusion zone. Arguably, this concept was adequate as a protective device against
intrusion of political power into a field of action. However, the subtle seduction of economic
incentives cannot be counteracted by the law guaranteeing a space of autonomy to the
victim of seduction. This is a challenge for institutional imagination. "Proceduralisation" of
constitutional rights in the direction of legal procedures could become effective guarantees
of discursive autonomy. One possibility is pluralisation of the sources of dependency which
will  create  a  new  independence.  A  constitutional  duty  for  the  state  to  guarantee  a
multiplicity of financial resources for research, for art, for education could have some
effects  on  the  autonomy  of  social  discourses  equivalent  to  the  traditional  rights
construction.
35 What is asked for is a new proceduralisation of constitutional rights in the
so-called private sphere.
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Driving motive behind such an extension of constitutional rights in the private sphere
is the more general normative argument to constitutionalise private law. This is not only to
argue for the infusion of the law of contract, tort and property with the values of the political
constitution which is important enough, rather for transforming private law itself into a new
constitutional law. If it is true that today’s private governance regimes are producing vast
amounts of law that govern, regulate and adjudicate wide areas of social activities then the24
question of a "constitution" for these private regimes is as pressing as the constitutional
question was for the monarchical political regimes in recent European history. Traditional
private law could be fundamentally transformed to play this role of a private constitution
protecting the many autonomies of civil society. It is not the Concordia of Ambrogio
Lorenzetti’s Buon governo that is in sight, what is envisaged is more sober and modest
than  revitalised  communitarian  aspirations  in  law  -  externally  imposed  legal-political
restrictions on the self-destructive tendencies of expansive social systems.25
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